Politics 2.0: the Multifaceted Effect of Broadband Internet on Political Participation by Campante, Filipe et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
POLITICS 2.0: THE MULTIFACETED EFFECT OF BROADBAND INTERNET
ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Filipe R. Campante
Ruben Durante
Francesco Sobbrio
Working Paper 19029
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19029
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
May 2013
We are very grateful to “Osservatorio Banda Larga-Between” for providing us access to the data on
ADSL coverage of Italian municipalities used in this paper. We also thank Nicola D’Amelio and Giuseppe
Piraino for their help with data collection, and Stefano Gagliarducci for sharing his dataset on Italian
municipal elections. We thank Adriana Camacho, Stefano DellaVigna, Matthew Ellman, Leopoldo
Fergusson, Ed Glaeser, Rema Hanna, Andrea Ichino, Andrea Mattozzi, Luke Miner, Luigi Pascali,
Nicola Persico, Giacomo Ponzetto, Andrei Shleifer, David Yanagizawa-Drott, and seminar participants
at the European University Institute, Harvard University, the Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, Tufts University,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and at the X Workshop in Media Economics (Bogotá). Maria Chiara Cavalleri
and Marta Fana provided excellent research assistance. Finally, special thanks go to Silvio Berlusconi
for forcing early elections in 2013 and thus expediting our data collection process. The usual disclaimers
apply. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2013 by Filipe R. Campante, Ruben Durante, and Francesco Sobbrio. All rights reserved. Short
sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided
that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
Politics 2.0: The Multifaceted Effect of Broadband Internet on Political Participation
Filipe R. Campante, Ruben Durante, and Francesco Sobbrio
NBER Working Paper No. 19029
May 2013, Revised October 2013
JEL No. D72,L82,L86
ABSTRACT
We investigate the causal impact of broadband Internet on political participation using data from Italy.
We show that this impact varies across different forms of political engagement and over time. Initially,
broadband had a negative effect on turnout in national elections, driven by increased abstention of
ideologically extreme voters. Meanwhile, however, broadband fostered other forms of online and offline
participation. Over time, the negative effect was reverted due to the emergence of new political entrepreneurs
who used the Internet to convert the initial “exit” back into “voice”. Overall, these nuanced effects
underscore the general equilibrium dynamic induced by the Internet.
Filipe R. Campante
Harvard Kennedy School
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER
filipe_campante@harvard.edu
Ruben Durante
Department of Economics, Sciences Po
28, rue des Saints Pères
75007 Paris France
Ruben.Durante@sciences-po.org
Francesco Sobbrio
Catholic University of Milan
Largo Gemelli 1
20123, Milano
Italy
francesco.sobbrio@unicatt.it
1. INTRODUCTION
The advent of the Internet has dramatically transformed the way individuals obtain, produce, and
exchange information. There is a widespread belief that such a revolution is likely to have a profound
impact on various dimensions of social life, not the least on politics.1
Several competing hypotheses have been advanced regarding the possible impact of Internet on polit-
ical participation. A positive view is that the Internet makes it easier for citizens to acquire political
information from more and more diverse sources, and, to the extent that better-informed citizens tend
to be more participative (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, 1999; Lassen, 2005), it should therefore
increase political participation. A less optimistic view focuses instead on the possibility that, since
the Internet provides unprecedented entertainment opportunities, individuals may devote less time to
informing themselves about politics and, by the same token, will ultimately be less informed and less
engaged.
Others have instead emphasized the importance of the Internet as a coordination device, and its poten-
tial to facilitate collective action. As stated by Kevin Werbach, “The internet fundamentally lowers
the barriers to organization [...] Like-minded souls no longer need painstakingly to build an orga-
nizational structure; a mailing-list is often enough to band together online” (The Economist, Jan 5,
2013). This would also lead, presumably, to increased political participation, though here again the
coordinating role of the Internet could be devoted to non-political activities that might crowd out the
political kind.
Set against these multiple possibilities, estimating the causal impact of the Internet on political partic-
ipation is a challenging empirical task, for several reasons. First, and quite obviously, Internet access
is likely to be correlated with a variety of relevant socio-economic characteristics that may influence
political participation through other channels. Second, and at least as important, the introduction of
such a revolutionary technology is likely to trigger complex transformations, both on what we may
call the “demand” and the “supply” sides of politics. Put simply, the Internet changes the incentives
and technological possibilities available to political actors, so that its effects in the short and in the
long run, once “general equilibrium” repercussions are taken into account, may differ considerably.
This paper tackles these questions in the context of the introduction of high-speed (broadband) Inter-
net in Italy, a developed country with solid democratic institutions, but where traditional media, such
as TV and newspapers, are largely controlled by the government or by powerful private interests.
To do so, we exploit differences in the timing of the introduction of broadband (ADSL) technology
across Italian municipalities, between 2005 and 2011, to analyze how access to high-speed internet
affected individuals’ decisions with regard to different forms of political involvement.
To deal with the endogeneity in the access to broadband Internet, we exploit the fact that the diffusion
1 See Larcinese and Miner (2012) for several interesting pieces of anecdotal evidence on views regarding
the economic and political consequences of the Internet, and Hindman (2009) and Farrell (2012) for an
overview of the debate among scholars and political activists.
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of ADSL technology in a given municipality is affected by its relative position in the pre-existing
voice telecommunications infrastructure. Specifically, we use the distance between a given munici-
pality and the closest high-order telecommunication exchange (“Urban Group Stage”, UGS) – which
represents a good proxy for the investment required to connect the municipality – as a source of ex-
ogenous variation for the availability of high-speed internet. Since the pre-existing infrastructure was
not randomly distributed, our identification strategy relies on interacting that distance with the time
variation between the period before and after broadband became available, under the assumption that
the correlation between distance and unobserved municipal characteristics did not change at that point
in time, other than through the introduction of the Internet.
Our findings point to a complex chain of effects in which the impact of broadband internet availability
changes over time and is crucially affected by the reaction of the political “supply side”. We first doc-
ument that the diffusion of broadband led, initially, to a significant decline in electoral turnout in na-
tional parliamentary elections between 1996-2001 (pre-broadband) and 2006-2008 (post-broadband).
This effect is sizeable – about 7 percentage points for going from zero to full broadband access –
and very robust to the use of various measures of broadband access and various specifications. In-
terestingly, we find that this initial negative effect of Internet on turnout was largely reversed in the
following elections, held in 2013.
To shed light on this nuanced pattern, we first document that the initial decline in turnout was es-
pecially detrimental to the electoral performance of “outsider” parties – i.e. ideologically extreme
forces outside the mainstream coalitions – whose supporters are generally well informed and politi-
cally active. This is consistent with the diffusion of Internet having led to a particularly engaged but
disenchanted segment of the electorate dropping out of the mainstream electoral process.
At the same time, we find that Internet diffusion fostered other forms of political participation. First,
using a unique data set on the geographic distribution of local grassroots protest groups organized
through the online platform Meetup.com, we show that the diffusion of broadband was associated with
these groups forming earlier and growing faster. More interestingly, the strength of the online local
groups soon translated into greater support for the Five-Star Movement (M5S), a largely web-based
political movement that coalesced around those online groups and gradually evolved into a potent
electoral force. Indeed, looking at local elections starting in 2008, we document that broadband access
was positively associated with the presence of the M5S on the ballots, and with electoral support for
the M5S lists. In addition, we document that turnout in the 2009 and 2011 national referenda – which
had a distinct anti-establishment flavor – was actually higher in better connected municipalities.
These results suggest that political entrepreneurs eventually seized the opportunity of using the Inter-
net to fish into the pool of disenchanted (but engaged and “connected”) individuals that the Internet
itself had initially contributed to create, favoring their return to mainstream electoral politics. This
tendency is confirmed by the results for the 2013 parliamentary elections, when the M5S first run at
the national level, and which show a positive effect of broadband access on the electoral performance
of the M5S and other new “web-friendly” parties.
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In sum, our evidence underscores what we may call the “general-equilibrium” repercussions of the
change in media technology exemplified by the onset of high-speed Internet. That shock entails a shift
on the “demand side” of the political process, as voters react to the new medium; this, however, is
merely the first reaction in the more complex chain. Eventually, political entrepreneurs on the supply
side take advantage of the opportunity presented by the initial demand-side movement – and by the
possibilities and low barriers to entry that characterize the new medium itself – to enhance political
mobilization in ways that eventually feed back and alter the initial landscape. Quite simply, using the
classic framework of “exit, voice, and loyalty” (Hirschman, 1970), it seems that the new medium ini-
tially constituted an “exit” option from the mainstream political process, but was eventually harnessed
into a new “voice” mechanism within that process.
This framework makes clear that this exit-to-voice transition is quite natural, once we consider that the
effect of that mainstream political process on public-good provision ought to induce Hirschmanian
“loyalty”: it is essentially impossible to completely exit its reach (at least short of emigration). In
addition, while we might expect a similar pattern to hold with different instances of shifts in media
technology, that transition seems especially relevant for the case of the Internet. Its interactivity
and prevalence of user-generated content translate into relatively low barriers to entry, and make it
particularly suited for exploitation by a wide range of political actors, including newcomers. Grasping
these general equilibrium effects is thus crucial to understanding the political impact of changes in
the media environment, and particularly so for the Internet.
Our paper relates to the vast literature on the role of mass media and information in the political pro-
cess, and on what it would lead us to expect from the diffusion of the Internet.2 While many studies
on episodes of new media technologies have found a positive effect on turnout (e.g. Strömberg, 2004
on radio, Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson, 2011 on newspapers), some have documented the pos-
sibility of negative effects on electoral participation due to a crowding-out effect over traditional (and
potentially more informative) media (e.g. Gentzkow, 2006 on television). Our empirical evidence is
consistent with the presence of a (short-run) negative effect, but it qualifies its nature; in particular, we
show that the individuals who dropped out initially as a result of broadband expansion were relatively
more likely to be politically informed and engaged. This makes it unlikely that the demobilization we
identify would have been induced by simple crowding out. In addition, it highlights that the political
equilibrium reacts in ways that may eventually compensate for any initial demobilization.
Our work also relates to the incipient literature on the specific link between Internet and electoral
politics.3 Specifically, a few recent contributions have exploited within-country variation in broad-
band availability to assess the impact of the Internet on political outcomes, and turnout in particular.
Miner (2012) examines the effect of Internet use on voting behavior in Malaysia, instrumenting In-
2 See Prat and Strömberg (2011) for an extensive literature review on the political economy of media.
3 More broadly, our work relates to the literature on the political economy of the Internet which includes,
among others, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011), Enikolopov, Petrova, and Sonin (2012), Larcinese and Miner
(2012), and Jaber (2013).
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ternet penetration with the distance of each electoral district from the backbones of Malaysia’s main
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). He finds that Internet penetration increased turnout and decreased
the electoral returns of the incumbent party. Czernich (2012) and Falck, Gold, and Heblich (2012)
look instead at the effects of Internet on turnout and electoral competition in Germany. In spite of
using a similar empirical strategy based on other technical features of ADSL technology, they find
contrasting results on turnout (positive and insignificant versus negative, respectively). Finally, ex-
ploiting differences across U.S. states in right-of-way (ROW) laws, Larcinese and Miner (2012) find
a positive effect on the Democratic party’s vote share but no significant effect on turnout.
Our paper differs from these contributions in many respects. In terms of empirical strategy, using
not only the position of different localities in the pre-existing voice telecommunication infrastructure,
but also its interaction with time, considerably strengthens identification. Specifically, the longitudi-
nal dimension of our data and the characteristics of our instrumental variable allow us to control for
both time-invariant municipal characteristics and differential trends related to relevant demographics.
Just as significantly, it allows us to estimate our effect on the entire sample, rather than relying on
a restricted set of peculiar localities. Most importantly, from a conceptual point of view, our con-
tribution emphasizes the general equilibrium implications of the introduction of the Internet, how
its impact can vary over time, across different forms of online and offline participation, and interact
with the evolution of the political supply, all aspects that previous contributions have not been able
to address. While the short-run impact on voter turnout is certainly relevant, our approach provides a
unified perspective on the ultimate chain of effects, and shows that it can be very different from those
partial-equilibrium effects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the conceptual framework
that will guide the interpretation of our empirical findings. Section 3 provides relevant background in-
formation on the diffusion of broadband in Italy and on the Italian institutional and political landscape
over the period under examination. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 5
presents the results on the impact of broadband on turnout in parliamentary elections, while Section
6 discusses some evidence on other forms of participation that can help elucidate the mechanism at
work. Section 7 concludes by summarizing our interpretation of the main findings, and discussing
alternative mechanism and external validity.
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
We start off with a brief conceptual discussion of the possible effects of broadband Internet on political
participation, to provide some structure to interpret our empirical results.
Why should the advent of the Internet matter for political engagement? First, the Internet constitutes
a new media technology providing users with a variety of new content, thus changing individual
incentives to acquire political information. On the one hand, the existing evidence has established
that, if a new medium makes it easier for individuals to do so from more and more diverse sources,
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its introduction could foster political participation. However, if it crowds out traditional sources of
political information – for example by providing new entertainment content – its introduction could
discourage political participation. This latter possibility seems particularly relevant for the case of
the Internet, which has brought along unprecedented levels of politically-related content, but also
virtually unlimited entertainment opportunities. It is thus natural that most of the fledgling literature
on its political impact has focused on this tension (Czernich, 2012; Falck, Gold, and Heblich, 2012).
The Internet is, however, much more than just another source of information and entertainment. Quite
uniquely when compared to other media, it represents a powerful (and relatively cheap) platform for
political discussion and participation, and for coordinating the actions of politically like-minded in-
dividuals. Although undoubtedly the advent of social media has greatly expanded these opportunities
for online political participation, these existed long before in various forms: from posting comments
on political blogs to politically-related emailing lists, inter alia. It is thus quite clear that, though cer-
tainly important, increased availability of information and entertainment is not necessarily the only
channel through which the Internet might affect political behavior.
To make sense of the implications of these multiple channels when it comes to political participation,
we resort to the celebrated framework of “exit, voice, and loyalty” proposed by Hirschman (1970),
which attempts to explain how individuals may react to discontent regarding any organization of
which they are part. In particular, in the context we analyze, we can think of mainstream democratic
politics – namely, the process through which political office-holders are selected and monitored in an
established democracy – as the organization of interest. The effect of broadband Internet on political
participation will depend on how it may affect citizens’ strategic options of exit – i.e. abstaining from
turning out in elections – versus voice – i.e. voting, or otherwise engaging with the electoral process.
Our previous discussion underscores that the Internet clearly offers both voice and exit options. Those
who are unhappy with mainstream politics can use online platforms to express their opinions about
elections, and to try to articulate activities that will affect them. On the other hand, the Internet offers
vast opportunities to drop out, either by tuning out of politics altogether, or by engaging with political
activities outside of the electoral mainstream.
When should we expect each option to prevail? They key point is that different strategies of voice and
exit will appeal to different types of (potential) voters, according to their levels of intrinsic political
engagement and of satisfaction with mainstream politics. All else equal, more engaged individuals
will presumably be less likely to tune out of politics altogether; similarly, individuals satisfied with
the existing state of the mainstream political process will be less likely to drop out. We summarize
these distinctions with the simple 2x2 matrix presented in Table 1.
To the extent that there are many voters who are either dissatisfied or relatively disengaged, the Inter-
net is likely to have an immediate negative impact on participation in the mainstream political process,
as both groups will take advantage of the improved exit options offered by the new technology. How-
ever, each of these two groups’ dropping out is likely to have very different long-term consequences,
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as they would pose very different incentives to political actors.
Individuals who have dropped out but are politically engaged constitute a pool of prospective voters
who are likely to return to active participation, as long as someone caters to their preferences and
addresses some of the sources of their discontent. The prospect of fishing in this pool obviously
constitutes a pulling factor for political entrepreneurs to whom, in addition, the Internet itself offers
many new avenues for engaging with these potential voters. Quite significantly, the Internet imposes
very low barriers to entry, making these opportunities easily available even to those with limited
resources, and thus facilitating access by new political movements.
It follows that – as long as there is widespread voter disenchantment, as opposed to mere disengage-
ment – the diffusion of broadband access creates a demand for those political entrepreneurs to fill,
and provides them with powerful tools to tap into that demand opening vast possibilities to convert
the initial exit from mainstream electoral politics back into voice. As a consequence, the long-run,
general-equilibrium effect of the introduction of broadband Internet – that is, after taking into the
account the reaction from the “supply side” of politics – can be very different from its short-term
impact, and precisely because of the incentives that the latter poses.
We can further predict that such reversal is actually quite likely, again with reference to the standard
Hirschmanian framework, and specifically to the concept of “loyalty” induced by an organization.
With no particular moral connotation, the term here rather refers to how hard it is for an individual to
exit that organization. While it is a basic tenet that exit tends to drive out voice, it remains true that the
mainstream political process is a crucial driver of policy choices and public good (or bad) provision;
as such, it inevitably affects even those who have opted for exit. This exemplifies a situation such
that “full exit is impossible; in some sense, one remains (...) a member of the organization in spite of
formal exit.” (Hirschman, 1970, p.100) These are precisely the situations in which loyalist behavior
with respect to the organization is most likely. In other words, there will likely be sufficient underlying
loyalty so as to provide an opportunity for those who could devise, from the new medium, new voice
options that could be brought to the mainstream.
In sum, this interpretation suggests a nuanced interplay between “voice” and “exit” strategies. More-
over, such mechanism clearly underscores the importance of the general equilibrium effects in any
episode of diffusion of high-speed Internet – and more broadly, for any change in media environment.
Quite simply, we should expect its effects to shift over time – from exit back to voice – once the sup-
ply side of politics has endogenously responded to the initial shock, precisely by targeting the inflated
contingent of demobilized (but politically engaged) voters.
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3. BACKGROUND
3.1. BROADBAND INTERNET IN ITALY
Broadband Internet connection to residential customers in Italy has been traditionally provided through
Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) technology, while the use of alternative technologies,
such as cable and satellite, has remained negligible (OECD, 2001; Between, 2008).4 ADSL technol-
ogy was introduced by the Italian telecommunications incumbent operator (Telecom Italia) in 1999;
the broadband infrastructure developed rather slowly at first, but at a faster pace in the following
years. If by the end of 2000 only 117 out of 8,100 Italian municipalities had access to ADSL, by the
end of 2005 ADSL was available in about half of them, accounting for about 86% of the population.
Figure 1 summarizes the evolution in Italy of both the availability of ADSL Internet access (panel
A), and Internet penetration in terms of the share of population with an ADSL subscription (panel B),
between the end of 2000 and 2011, with election years marked by dashed vertical lines. Because in
2001 the levels of access and penetration were very small, we take this to be the last “pre-broadband”
election cycle.
ADSL technology typically relies on data transmission over the user’s copper telephone line, and as a
result access to ADSL depends crucially on the user’s position in the pre-existing voice telecommu-
nications infrastructure. Two technical parameters are especially important in this regard. The first
one is the length of the so-called “local loop”, i.e. the distance between the end user’s premises and
the closest telecommunication exchange (or “central office”, henceforth CO). If this distance is above
a certain threshold (between 4 and 5km), the ADSL connection cannot be implemented through tra-
ditional copper wires, but instead requires the deployment of fiber optic cables between the CO and
the user’s premises. This procedure involves significant costs since, unlike copper wires, fiber optic
cables need to be laid underground. The second parameter is the distance between the CO and the
closest higher-order telecommunication exchange, the Urban Group Stage (UGS), corresponding to
the portion of the network referred to as “backhaul”. For a given area to have access to ADSL, the
respective CO must be connected to the closest UGS through fiber optic cables.5
In the context of Italy, the first parameter has not constituted a limiting factor to the development of
the broadband infrastructure since, unlike other countries, Italy’s voice telecommunications network
has traditionally been characterized by a very short average length of the local loop: more than 95%
of end users are located at less than 4km from the closest CO, and about 100% at less than 5km
(OECD, 2001, see Figure B.1 in Appendix).This situation has allowed telecom operators to provide
ADSL access in most municipalities through a system, the “Fiber To The Exchange” (FTTE), that
requires the deployment of fiber optic cables between UGSs and COs, but not between COs and end
4 Definitions of broadband Internet access vary widely (OECD, 2001, p.6). The most common definition of
“broadband” adopted by many telecommunications operators as well as by the OECD refers to technologies
that allow for data download speed of at least 256 Kbps. At the end of 2007, ADSL technology accounted
for more than 97% of broadband access in Italy (Between, 2008).
5 For more details on the technical background regarding ADSL in Italy, see Appendix B.
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users’ premises (see Figure B.2 for an illustration of the FTTE system).
Consequently, the distance between a municipality’s COs and the closest UGS - which, quite impor-
tantly, was completely irrelevant for voice communication purposes - represents the main determinant
of the investment needed to provide access to ADSL in that municipality. Indeed, this distance and
the necessity to cover it using optical fiber cables has been the main factor behind the delay in ADSL
adoption experienced by different municipalities over time (Ciapanna and Sabbatini, 2008). What
is important for the purposes of our analysis is that, since the 10,700 COs and the 628 UGSs were
inherited from the pre-existing voice telecommunication system, their location was determined sev-
eral decades before the advent of the Internet (Impiglia et al. 2004, AGCOM, 2011). Hence, all else
equal, the closer to an UGS a municipality happened to be when ADSL came into the picture, the
more likely that a telecom operator would have provided that municipality with ADSL access earlier
on in the diffusion process.6
For a given distance between the CO and the closest UGS, of course, the decision of whether to
provide ADSL access to a given municipality also depends on a range of socio-demographic factors
which can affect the expected commercial return of the investment, i.e. population density, income
and education levels, etc. Indeed, ADSL technology was introduced earlier in more densely popu-
lated areas, typically urban and suburban. Figure 2 reports the distribution of access to broadband
internet across Italian municipalities in 2005, the first year for which data are available, with ADSL
availability increasing from dark (no access) to light (complete access).
3.2. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND (1996-2013)
Italy is a parliamentary democracy characterized by a bicameral legislative system consisting of a
lower and an upper house (Chamber of Deputies and Senate).7 Five national legislative elections
have been held over the past seventeen years, in 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, and 2013. This is the period
we focus on, as it constitutes the set of elections since the collapse of the Italian post-World War
II party system (the “First Republic”), in 1994, in the wake of the widespread corruption that was
brought to light in the early 1990s by the set of judicial investigations that became known as Mani
Pulite (“Clean Hands”).
Over most of the period, right up to the 2013 elections, the Italian political landscape was largely dom-
6 Notice that the cost of supplying ADSL to a municipality is increasing in the distance to the closest UGS not
just because of the cost of fiber optic cables and excavation per se. Telecommunication operators typically
need the authorization of the municipalities where these cables have to be deployed (Ciapanna and Sabba-
tini, 2008). Similarly, private landowners may, in principle, also delay the development of the broadband
infrastructure when cable deployment involves their private property. As shown by Larcinese and Miner
(2012) for the US, these dimensions are quite relevant in determining the bureaucratic costs that Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) have to incur in order to provide broadband internet in a given geographical area.
Hence, the farther away the closest UGS is, the higher these bureaucratic costs are likely to be.
7 While all Italians aged 18 or more are entitled to vote for the Chamber, only those aged 25 or more can vote
for the Senate.
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inated by two main coalitions, from the center-right and the center-left, whose we will later describe
in greater detail. The center-right coalition, led by Silvio Berlusconi, owner of Italy’s largest private
media conglomerate, has typically included the heirs to the former fascist party, a northern separatist
party (the Northern League), and, until 2006, part of the former Christian-Democrats. The center-left
coalition includes part of the former communist party, left-leaning former Christian-Democrats, and a
few smaller parties. Both coalitions comprise a bigger and relatively moderate party, which accounts
for a very large share of the coalition’s votes, alongside smaller and more ideologically extreme ones.
Despite the presence of these two coalitions, the Italian political system has remained relatively frag-
mented, with more than thirty parties running in each election, and parties outside the mainstream
coalitions attracting significant electoral support. This tendency was even more pronounced in 2013,
with the presence of a centrist coalition led by former prime minister Mario Monti, and, most impor-
tantly, the considerable electoral performance of the Five-Star Movement (henceforth M5S), led by
blogger and former comedian Beppe Grillo.
In addition to national parliamentary elections, our analysis will also focus on all municipal elections
held between 2001 and 2012. This is especially important for our analysis because the M5S became
politically active at the local level a few years before entering the national stage. Finally, we will also
look at participation in national referenda. According to the Italian constitution, referenda can only be
used to abrogate existing laws (or part of them) and require a 50% turnout quorum to be valid. Various
referenda have been held over the past few years, on a variety of issues ranging from electoral rules
to public management of water supply and nuclear energy, among others. These referenda, which are
promoted by popular initiative, have been largely ignored, when not overtly boycotted, by mainstream
parties (and mainstream media), and hence provide voters with a rather different, and relatively anti-
establishment, opportunity for political participation.
3.2.1. EMERGENCE AND RISE OF THE FIVE-STAR MOVEMENT (M5S)
In the most recent parliamentary elections, held in February 2013, the M5S emerged as the most
voted party, obtaining 25.5% of the votes. This represented the best electoral performance for a party
running for the first time in national elections in post-war Italy. Since the general perception is that
the Internet was central to the emergence and political development of the M5S, it thus provides us
with a unique opportunity to understand the impact of Internet on political participation, both online
and offline. The M5S started in 2005 as a grassroots protest movement, and then consolidated into an
organized political actor running for elections first at the local level, and finally at the national level.
Internet and social media are at the heart of the M5S organization and political activism, especially
in light of its rejection of mainstream media, which M5S activists see as captured by powerful eco-
nomic and political interests. A cornerstone of this organization is the blog that Beppe Grillo, the
Movement’s charismatic leader, created in January of 2005, from which most of M5S political initia-
tives have traditionally originated. Another is the online platform Meetup.com, which has been used
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by Beppe Grillo’s supporters since 2005 to organize in thematic groups and coordinate their activities
at the local level.8 The Meetup.com platform has represented the springboard for the later emergence
of a decentralized bottom-up political movement that ultimately made the leap to the national stage.
In the first phase of the blog/Meetup experience, between 2005 and 2007, the initiatives promoted by
Grillo and his supporters were primarily aimed at voicing widespread popular discontent with the lack
of transparency and accountability in the Italian political system. Their criticism was directed against
corruption, the misuse of public funds by political parties, the inadequacy of the electoral system,
and the absence of legislation imposing both term limits on elected officials and the ineligibility of
previously convicted politicians.9 Despite the considerable popular response they generated, these
initiatives were largely ignored by mainstream politicians.
Grillo and his supporters then moved towards the creation of an active political movement to run
in elections. This new phase begun in 2008, when Grillo announced on his website that he would
endorse local groups of citizens willing to run for elections, particularly at the local level, as long as
candidates subscribed to the movement’s platform on a variety of issues (including free and universal
broadband Internet access) and satisfied certain transparency requirements: no affiliation to any party,
and no prior penal conviction. The endorsement would take the form of a quality certification “five-
star seal”.10
The first Five-Star-certified lists ran in municipal elections in 2008, in a handful of municipalities, and
in Sicily’s regional elections in that same year, with rather modest outcomes. Since then, the M5S
has taken part in an increasing number of municipal and regional elections with increasing success.
It elected its first mayor in 2010, and became the most voted party in Sicily’s 2012 regional elections,
before running for national elections in 2013.
Throughout this trajectory, the use of web-based social media and of the original network of local
Meetup groups has remained absolutely central to the evolution and growing electoral success of
8 The Meetup.com platform was created in 2001 in the US, to facilitate online networking of people sharing
similar interests towards enabling them to meet in person. Howard Dean is understood to be the first
prominent politician to use the Meetup.com platform on a large scale to coordinate his supporters, during
the 2004 Democratic party primaries. As pointed out by Hindman (2009): ‘New technology allowed Dean
to create local, decentralized social networks from scratch.” (Hindman, 2009, p. 32). Interestingly, it
seems that most of the Dean campaign volunteers recruited through the Meetup.com platform had not been
involved in previous electoral campaigns Hindman (2009).
9 For example, in November 2005, Grillo’s blog launched a fund-raising campaign aimed at financing the
publishing of a list of previously convicted Italian MPs on the International Herald Tribune, in the context
of the so-called “Clean Parliament Initiative”. On September 8 2007, a campaign was launched in several
Italian cities to collect the signatures required to propose three laws of popular initiative to Parliament,
dealing with the ineligibility of convicted politicians, the imposition of a two-term limit for both national
and local elected officials, and a reform of the electoral system. Overall, more than 300,000 signatures were
collected in one day.
10 The M5S refuses to be framed in the traditional left-right dimension, claiming to be “beyond” it. Indeed,
some points of the M5S political platform (e.g., the emphasis on green energy or extended unemployment
benefits) have clear roots in the tradition of leftist parties or the green wave started in western Europe in
the 80s like the German Grünen (Pedrazzani and Pinto, 2013). At the same time, other parts of the M5S’
program (e.g., the opposition to Roma immigration) seem closer to the positions of right-wing parties.
10
M5S. Indeed, the selection of M5S national candidates has been carried out through online primary
elections among M5S early activists. Furthermore, evidence on the presence of candidates from
different parties on the web suggests that, despite the lack of financial resources on the same scale
available to other parties, M5S candidates have been especially successful in communicating with
potential voters through web-based platforms such as Youtube and social media such as Facebook,
Twitter, Google+ and Foursquare (Mosca and Vaccari, 2013).
4. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
4.1. DATA
Electoral data at the municipal level for both local and parliamentary elections as well as for pop-
ular referenda are available from the Italian Ministry of Interior. The Italian administrative system
includes 8,100 municipalities with a median area of 22km2 and median population of 2,468 people;
each municipality belongs to one of 110 provinces, and each province to one of 20 regions.11 We
focus on the balanced sample of 7,969 municipalities for which we have information for all of the
parliamentary elections we consider.12 The data include information on eligible voters, turnout, and
votes for individual parties and referendum questions. We focus, in particular, on the past five parlia-
mentary elections, held respectively in 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 and 2013, on the municipal elections
held between 2001 and 2012, and on two series of referenda held respectively in 2009 and 2011.13
Data on the Beppe Grillo/M5S Meetup groups were gathered directly from the Meetup.com platform,
by applying a crawling procedure on the webpage of each group related to either Beppe Grillo or the
M5S. For each group we collected the following information: date of formation, geographic location,
number of members, and the date at which each member joined the group; when multiple groups are
present in a given municipality, we consider the date at which the oldest group was formed.
Data on the availability of ADSL technology in Italian municipalities were provided by the “Osserva-
torio Banda Larga-Between,” a joint-venture between the main Italian telecommunications operators,
the Italian Ministry for Telecommunications and other private and public stakeholders. The data
include information on the percentage of households with access to ADSL-based services in each
Italian municipality between 2005 and 2011 on an asymmetric six-point scale, ranging from zero to
5, corresponding to the following brackets: 0%, 1-50%, 51-75%, 76-85%, 86-95%, and above 95%.14
No data are available for previous years, and we set the measure to zero for year 2001 and before,
11 When looking at parliamentary elections we exclude the region of Valle D’Aosta, since it adopted a different
electoral system with respect to the one used in the other regions, starting with the 2001 elections. This
means that we will have 109 provinces in our sample.
12 Results are essentially unaltered if we consider all municipalities available in any given year.
13 Three other series of popular referenda were held respectively in 2003, 2005 and 2006. Unfortunately
municipal data on turnout in these referenda are not available from any source.
14 Figure B.5 in Appendix B reports the distribution of ADSL coverage by year with the percentage of house-
hold with ADSL access increasing from grey (limited access) to black (full access).
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as an approximation of the very low levels of broadband penetration at the time (reported in Figure
1). Also, since our data on broadband access stops at the end of 2011, we attribute the 2011 data to
election year 2013, a choice which naturally introduces some additional measurement error.
We choose to use data on broadband access, rather than penetration, first and foremost because the
latter is obviously the result of endogenous individual decisions. That said, and very much as ex-
pected, the data show a clear positive link between broadband access and penetration at the regional
level, the lowest level for which penetration data is available for Italy (see Figure B.6 in Appendix
B). More specifically, we use the six-point scale as our main measure of broadband Internet exposure,
and label it “Broadband Access”.
However, we also experiment with alternative measures of broadband access, both for robustness and
to better interpret the nature of our results. First, we use “Years Since Good Broadband”, defined
as the number of years since at least 50% of households in a municipality have ADSL access. The
main advantage of this measure is that it allows for the possibility that the effect of the Internet
accumulates over time; an important disadvantage, however, is that we are forced to consider 2005
as the first year of good broadband access for all municipalities that were covered up to that point,
because that is the first year for which we data are available. This naturally adds considerable noise to
this measure in the early years of our sample. On the other hand, the error introduced by attributing
2011 broadband access data to the 2013 observations should be less important when we consider this
alternative measure.
In addition, we also use two dummy variables computed from the six-point scale: “Full Access”,
which takes the value of 1 if “Broadband Access” is equal to 5 (above 95% access), and “Some
Access”, which takes the value of 1 if “Broadband Access” is greater than 0. The use of these measures
will facilitate interpretation, as they do not rely on the asymmetric scale, and will allow us to better
understand what variation driving our results. Still, we keep “Broadband Access” as our main measure
of interest, so as to not discard information.
Finally, information on additional socio-demographic controls, which we discuss below, is available
from the Italian national statistical office (ISTAT).15
4.2. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
Following our discussion on the characteristics of the Italian broadband infrastructure, our identi-
fication strategy exploits the role played by the distance between the existing Central Office (CO)
supplying voice services to a given municipality and the closest urban group exchanges (UGS). First
of all, we rely on the fact that this distance represented the main determinant of the cost of supplying
ADSL services in a municipality, given the technical need to deploy optical fiber connection between
the municipality’s CO and the closest UGS. As such, we would expect the distance to the closest UGS
15 Descriptive statistics for all of our main variables can be found in Appendix Tables A.1-A.3.
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to affect the pattern of ADSL rollout across different municipalities. The clear negative relationship
between distance to the closest UGS and broadband access (as of 2006) is depicted in Figure 3.
As pointed out before, the presence and the location of both the COs and UGSs precede the develop-
ment (and even the existence) of broadband in Italy. This of course does not mean that their spatial
distribution is random, and, in fact, the data reveal that UGSs are more likely to be located, for in-
stance, in provincial capitals, and, more generally, in more densely populated and educated places.
These are all characteristics that could be expected to correlate with our outcomes of interest in ways
that could confound causal interpretation. We can go some way in addressing these confounding fac-
tors by exploiting the panel structure of our data and including municipality fixed effects; however,
this evidently does not control for those factors that change over time.
To deal with this issue, our key source of variation will be the interaction between the distance from a
municipality to the closest UGS and a dummy for the post-2001 period (i.e. after the introduction of
broadband Internet). In essence, we implement a differences-in-differences approach, which has the
important advantage of letting us use variation from a broad set of municipalities, thereby naturally
enhancing the generalizability of our findings. As usual, our underlying identification assumption is
that, whatever correlation existed between the distance to the closest UGS and relevant municipality
characteristics, this did not change at the time of introduction of ADSL technology. In other words,
we are identifying off of the change in the impact of distance on the outcomes of interest, under the
assumption that any change in that impact occurs solely through the introduction of Internet.
This basic assumption justifies the following two-stage specification:
Ym,t = γBroadbandm,t +βXm,t +αm + τt + εm,t (1)
Broadbandm,t = φ(Distance_UGSm×Post-2001)+σXm,t +ζm +θt +ηm,t (2)
where subscripts m and t indicate respectively municipality and electoral year, Y represents the out-
come of interest (e.g. turnout), α and ζ are sets of municipality fixed effects, τ and θ are year fixed
effects, and X encompasses a set of control variables that we discuss below. Broadband stands for one
of the measures of broadband access described above. Distance_UGS is the (time-invariant) distance
from a municipality’s centroid to the closest UGS. We interact this variable with a dummy (Post-
2001) that takes the value of 1 for electoral years after 2001. This implies that the shift introduced
by the availability of ADSL technology stays constant after its introduction, which seems consistent
with the data.16
Our basic identification assumption will be violated if there are subjacent trends in our outcomes
16 We also experiment with letting that impact vary with time, by setting T = 1 for 2001, T = 2 for 2002, and
successively, and the basic results are consistent. However, if we exclude the pre-2001 period and focus on
the later years only, the interaction between distance and time loses its power as a predictor of broadband
access. This indicates that the shift introduced by ADSL availability was indeed a one-off.
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of interest that happen to correlate with factors that are in turn correlated with Distance_UGS. For
instance, it could be the case that turnout evolved differentially in urban versus rural places around
the time of the introduction of ADSL technology, for reasons unrelated to the Internet. To account for
this possibility, we make use of a number of municipal socio-demographic characteristics available
from the 2001 Census. Specifically, we include in X the interaction of those characteristics with either
a fourth-order polynomial in time, or with the Post-2001 dummy, or, finally, with election year fixed
effects. This lets us control very flexibly for the possibility of differential time trends: the polynomial
allows those trends to differ smoothly, the Post-2001 dummy considers the possibility of a break
around the introduction of broadband, and the year fixed effects impose minimal structure. Hence,
our identification strategy requires that there is no change in the correlation between distance to UGS
and the outcomes of interest around the time of broadband introduction once we account for those
demographic-related trends.
The set of demographic variables includes population, age structure (measured by the share of pop-
ulation aged 65 or more, and the share aged 20 to 34, i.e. old and young voters), and urbanization
(measured on a 3-point scale according to the ISTAT classification).17 As shown in Appendix Table
A.4, these variables are highly correlated with the initial diffusion of the internet, as was to be ex-
pected. What is more, Appendix Table A.5 shows that broadband internet access (as of 2006) is not
correlated with our key dependent variable (turnout) once these demographic variables are accounted
for. This suggests that controlling for them indeed helps us focus on the idiosyncratic component of
the variation in that access, thus complementing the fixed effects strategy that controls for unobserved
time-invariant municipality characteristics. For the sake of robustness, we also add a second set of
demographic controls, namely education, number of firms per capita, and the distance to the closest
provincial capital (capoluogo). Note in particular that, by including both urbanization and distance to
provincial capital, we are controlling in multiple ways for the possibility that small, isolated towns,
that are more likely to be far from a UGS, may have differential trends in our variables of interest, as
compared with larger urban centers.
Finally, we also control for regional dummies interacted with the election-year dummies to account
for any effect of unobservable regional factors that may vary over time.18 This allow us to further
account for any pre-existing or underlying trends that could confound the causal interpretation of our
estimated coefficients. In all regressions we cluster standard errors at the province level to allow for
the possibility of correlated shocks within each of the 109 provinces in our sample.
5. BROADBAND ACCESS AND TURNOUT IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS
Our central question is: what is the effect of broadband internet access on political participation? We
start by looking at turnout in Italian legislative elections (focusing on the lower House), comparing the
17 As it turns out, the only variable that is available on a yearly basis at the municipality level is population,
so we include that in all specifications as well.
18 Similar results obtain if we use province dummies instead of region.
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two pre-broadband elections of 1996 and 2001 to the three post-broadband elections of 2006, 2008,
and 2013. From an empirical perspective, looking at national elections has a major advantage in terms
of data availability: for every election year we have information for all the roughly 8,000 municipal-
ities. This greatly increases the effective sample size, and lets us take full advantage of the contrast
between the pre- and post-broadband eras, while controlling for unobserved municipality character-
istics. As emphasized in our conceptual discussion, the effect of the Internet on political engagement
could potentially vary considerably over time; looking at multiple post-broadband elections, allows
us to better examine the evolution of such effect.
5.1. PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE
We start by looking at the raw data. Figure 4 summarizes the evolution of the difference in turnout
between those localities that would eventually be early-adopters of broadband internet and those that
would turn out to lag in that respect. We can see rather clearly that, in the pre-broadband years of
1996 and 2001, the eventual early adopters display substantially higher turnout, consistent with the
fact that these are, on average, more educated and densely populated localities. This difference is
essentially unchanged between the two elections. However, the picture changes substantially after
broadband is introduced: the gap in turnout drops considerably, consistent with a substantial negative
initial effect of broadband access on turnout. However, it is also clear that, by 2013, the initial drop
is partially reversed.
How does this pattern relate to our key source of variation? To see it most clearly, let us consider
the distribution of municipalities according to distance to the closest UGS. Specifically, we take the
bottom and top 5% of that distribution, which correspond respectively to a distance of less than
3km and more than 30km from the closest UGS; we may think about these sub-samples as roughly
representing “treatment” and “control” groups in the natural experiment of broadband access induced
by the structure of the pre-existing telecommunications network.19 These groups are very different in
many dimensions, but it is nevertheless instructive to compare the evolution of turnout in each one of
them. To this end, we estimate a a regression of turnout on election-year fixed effects, and take the
average residual for each group as a measure of turnout relative to the national average for a given
election year.
The results, plotted in Figure 5, depict a very clear drop in turnout between the last pre-broadband
election (2001), and the first post-broadband election (2006) in the group more likely to have early
ADSL coverage. No comparable break is apparent for the “control” group, which shows a modest
uptick. This pattern helps validate our empirical strategy, suggesting that the reduction in the turnout
difference detected in Figure 4 is overwhelmingly driven by the “treated” group, and confirming the
19 The average “Broadband Access” scores of the two groups, as of 2006, were 4.6 and 1.6, respectively – the
share of unconnected municipalities was then 1.5% and 57%. Even by 2008, one in four municipalities in
the “control” group were still not connected, against less than 0.5% of the “treatment” group.
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absence of any discernible pre-existing trend in either group.20 Interestingly, we again see a partial
reversal of the initial movement in 2013, with an uptick in turnout for the early adopters and a drop
for the late adopters, which, by then, are much better connected than in previous elections years.
To examine how the change in electoral participation relates to distance from the closest UGS in the
overall sample of municipalities, it is also instructive to consider the coefficients from a reduced-form
regression of turnout on distance estimated separately for each election year. Figure 6 reports the
coefficients obtained from estimating such a regression including the full set of controls described
and both province and local labor market (SLL) fixed effects.21 Consistent with the evidence shown
above, it is clear that, prior to the advent of broadband, there was a stable and statistically signifi-
cant relationship between turnout and distance, with more distant places displaying lower levels of
turnout. However, this relationship essentially disappears upon the introduction of broadband in,
before reappearing in 2013.
Taken together, this preliminary evidence suggests a substantial negative effect of broadband access
on turnout upon the introduction of the technology, followed by a partial reversal in later years. In
what follows we show that this conclusion very much survives further scrutiny of the data.
5.2. “SHORT-RUN” EFFECTS: 2006/2008
We start by examining the more immediate impact of broadband introduction, by comparing the last
two pre-broadband elections, held in 1996 and 2001, and the first two post-broadband ones, held in
2006 and 2008. In Table 2 we implement the two-stage specification in (1) and (2) excluding 2013
from the sample. Column 1 reports the basic OLS results controlling for population and for region-
year and municipality fixed effects. The coefficient on broadband access is negative and statistically
significant suggesting that the advent of high-speed Internet was associated with lower turnout. The
estimated effect is, however, relatively small: going from zero to full broadband access would corre-
spond to a decline in turnout of about 2 p.p. (relative to an average turnout above 80% in 1996 and
2001).
We then instrument broadband access with the interaction between distance to the closest UGS and
the post-2001 dummy. Again, we find a negative and statistically significant effect (column 2). Quite
strikingly, the effect is a lot larger than in the baseline OLS specification: going from no zero full
broadband coverage is now associated with a decrease in turnout of almost 13 p.p. However, the
estimated effect drops substantially, to 7 p.p., when we control for the smooth trends (column 3); this
20 The only demographic variable for which we can build a similar plot is population, which is available on
a yearly basis. Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows that there seems to be smooth opposing trends in the
two groups, but no breaks are apparent between the pre- and post-broadband periods. We will return to this
when discussing the regression results.
21 Local labor markets (SLL) are commuting areas designated by the Italian statistical office as groups of
municipalities that are contiguous, and geographically and statistically comparable. The country is divided
in 658 SLLs, with each SLL comprising, on average, just over ten municipalities per SLL.
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suggests that it is indeed important to control for differential trends in population, age structure, and
urbanization.
Columns 4 to 6 show that this result is rather robust, qualitatively and quantitatively. First, the second
set of demographic controls does not affect the coefficient; if anything, the absolute value seems to
go up. In addition, the coefficient barely budges when we consider the interactions of demographics
with the Post-2001 dummy or with election year fixed effects, although it is estimated with a bit less
precision. These results document a robust and substantial negative effect of broadband Internet on
voter turnout in the immediate aftermath of its introduction.
In Table 3 we further test the robustness of this finding. As our baseline specification, we use the
one with the interaction between the first set of demographics and a fourth-order time polynomial
(as in column 3 of Table 2), since the inclusion of additional controls does not affect the estimated
coefficient. We first deal with the concern that the results could be driven by the contrast between
large cities, more likely to be close to a UGS, and small isolated towns. While we have controlled
throughout for the possibility of different trends according to the degree of urbanization, we then
re-estimate our main specification limiting our sample respectively to non-urban municipalities, as
designated by the ISTAT classification (column 1), and to municipalities without their own UGS
(column 2). In both cases the coefficient on broadband access remains virtually unchanged.
To further explore the nature of the effect, we then consider different measures of broadband access.
In column 3 we use “Years Since Good Broadband” and find a similarly negative effect. In this
case, however, the first stage becomes considerably weaker, likely due to measurement error which,
as discussed in Section 4.1, is particularly important for this measure in the early years of broad-
band diffusion. In columns 4 and 5 we then consider our two alternative dummy variables. Quite
remarkably, the coefficients are almost exactly the same for either the “Full Access” and the “Some
Access” dummy, and correspond quantitatively to essentially the same effect estimated for our base-
line “Broadband Access” measure (i.e. around 7 p.p.). This result suggests that the relevant variation
in our data is coming from the comparison between municipalities with no access (0) and those with
full access (5), rather than from municipalities with partial access (i.e. between 1 and 4) which, in
fact, only represent about 8% of our sample. This is consistent with the technological fact that the
bulk of the cost of broadband provision is to reach a given locality: once connected, it is relatively
inexpensive to provide it with full coverage.
In column 6, we attempt to deal in another way with the possibility that we could be picking up some
underlying trend in turnout that just happened to be correlated with the diffusion of broadband. To
do so, we run “placebo” IV specifications for the pre-ADSL election years of 1996 and 2001 only,
assuming that the patterns of internet access observed in 2006 had been present in 2001. Reassuringly,
we see no impact of this fictitious episode of introduction of broadband internet, a result which further
supports the view that our findings are not driven by pre-existing trends.
Finally, we also check the results against demographic patterns. For instance, it would be surprising,
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and concerning, if the effect of broadband was coming primarily largely from municipalities with
large senior populations, which would presumably be less exposed to the Internet. In columns (7) and
(8) we show that the effect is indeed significantly larger for municipalities with fewer elderly people
(i.e. in the bottom quartile of the distribution of the share of over-65-years-old), while there is no
effect for municipalities with older population (i.e. in the top quartile).
All in all, our estimates point very consistently to an immediate negative effect of the diffusion of
broadband on turnout, of the order of about 7 p.p. To get a better sense of what this magnitude
implies, following DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) and DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010), we compute
the corresponding “persuasion rate”. The persuasion rate is defined as the share of individuals who
did change their behavior, out of those who could have changed it to begin with. In our case, the
change in behavior is from voting to not voting, so the set of potentially affected individuals is the set
of those who turned out in 2001, corresponding to 79.8% of the total population. Considering that, in
2008, 45% of the Italian population reported having broadband internet (ISTAT), out of the 93% of
the population living in connected municipalities, and assuming that voters and non-voters are equally
likely to have broadband, we take that out of 100 Italians approximately 39 (100*0.798*0.45/0.93)
could potentially be affected by the broadband “treatment”. It follows that going from zero to full
access would imply a persuasion rate of approximately 18 (100*5*0.0145/0.39). In other words,
eighteen percent of the “treated” individuals were actually persuaded to abstain. This is very much
within the range of the persuasion rates (between 4 and 20) reported by DellaVigna and Gentzkow
(2010) in their survey of studies on the effect of media on voting behavior.
5.3. “LONG-RUN” EFFECTS: 2013
We now turn to the effects of broadband access as seen from the vantage point of the 2013 elections.
To do so, we compare the 2013 elections with the pre-broadband period (1996 and 2001), leaving
aside the elections of 2006 and 2008.
The results are shown in Table 4. In column 1 we estimate our preferred specification, with the
interaction between demographics and the time polynomial. The coefficient of interest is now statis-
tically insignificant and, although the absolute value is in line with what found in Table 2, the sign
of the coefficient is now positive. Hence, we find no evidence of a negative effect such as that docu-
mented for the immediate aftermath of broadband introduction. In line with the preliminary evidence
presented above, this result confirms that the immediate impact of broadband on turnout had been
largely reversed by 2013.22
The remainder of Table 4 further reinforces this message. First of all, we deal with the concern that,
by 2013, the places still left without broadband access might be quite peculiar (in fact the first-stage F-
22 In principle, a possible concern for our identification strategy as we reach 2013 may be posed by the pres-
ence of mobile broadband in areas where ADSL is not available. However, as explained in Appendix B,
the characteristics of the mobile broadband infrastructure, its coverage and the use of mobile broadband in
Italy all point to the conclusion that this is not an issue for our analysis.
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statistic is considerably smaller than in the previous tables, indicating that distance to the closest UGS
is less predictive of differences in broadband access by 2013.) In this respect, it is reassuring that,
when estimating the effect only on the sample of non-urban municipalities (column 2), the results
are very similar. Similarly, the picture does not change in columns 3 and 4 when we use “Years
Since Good Broadband” as measure of broadband access, a variable for which there is still a lot of
variation even as of 2013. It is also worth noting that the measurement error for this variable seems
less problematic in 2013, as illustrated by the fact that the first stage F-statistic is considerably larger
than in Table 2. Finally, the results remain unchanged in columns 5 and 6 when using the dummies
for “Full Access” and “Some Access” as alternative measures of Internet coverage.
In sum, our results show quite clearly that the effect of the Internet varied considerably over time:
while in the first years of Internet diffusion broadband had a substantial negative effect on turnout
in national elections, this tendency was at least partly reversed in later years. This pattern raises our
confidence in the identification strategy: indeed, any story that would ascribe the documented effect
to unrelated spurious trends should also explain this sharp reversal, which does not seem obvious.
5.4. FULL SAMPLE
For the sake of completeness, we also present the results of our estimation for the full sample of
elections, i.e. from 1996 to 2013 (Table 5). The pattern that emerges in columns 1 and 2 is quite sim-
ilar to what found in Table 2, with a negative, statistically significant coefficient that is considerably
larger for the IV specification (columns 1 and 2). This similarity is not surprising, since most of the
variation in the full sample comes from those initial years of the sample. The results do not change
much in columns 3 and 4 when we include interactions between demographic characteristics and a
fourth-order time polynomial to account for smooth unobservable trends.
Things look quite different, however, when we allow for the possibility of sharper trends, either
by interacting the demographics with the Post-2001 dummy (column 5) or with year fixed effects
(column 6). In this case, the estimated effect of broadband on turnout is not statistically significant
and much smaller in magnitude, estimated around 3 p.p. for going from no coverage to full coverage,
with the first stage also suffering considerably. It thus seems that the reversal pattern uncovered in
the previous analysis is being picked up as sharp trends in the data, thus confounding our empirical
strategy. By looking at these results, one might have concluded that the evidence of any effect of
broadband on electoral turnout is weak, when in fact there was a lot going on in the meantime.
6. BROADBAND ACCESS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: ELUCIDATING THE
MECHANISM
We have thus established that the impact of broadband Internet on political participation in Italian
elections varied substantially over time. We now turn to the task of trying to elucidate what were the
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driving forces behind this nuanced pattern.
6.1. WINNERS AND LOSERS
In line with our conceptual discussion, we want to understand what categories of voters were more
likely to drop out as a result of the introduction of broadband, since this would help elucidate the
incentives faced by both established political forces and potential newcomers. One way to do so is to
look at what parties and coalitions were more affected by the drop in turnout in early post-broadband
national elections. In fact, to the extent that supporters of different political forces differ with respect
to their level of political engagement and political information, documenting a differential impact of
Internet on voters of different parties could be extremely instructive.23
In Table 6 we distinguish between the mainstream center-right and center-left coalitions, and the
“outsiders”, that is, those political forces that come into elections with very little chance of affecting
political balance.24 We then compare the results obtained by these three groups of parties in the
elections of 2001 and 2008. We choose these years because in the 1996 elections the coalitions were
very different, and in 2006 different electoral rules greatly increased the incentive of smaller parties
to join the main coalitions; as a result, the definition of mainstream coalitions are very different in
these elections.
The first panel shows the coefficients on “Broadband Access” (with the full IV specification), using as
dependent variable the vote shares of each of the three groups. The results suggest that the mainstream
center-right and, especially, the center-left coalitions gained modestly at the expense of the outsider
parties. However, this initial conclusion is very much qualified by the results in the second panel
where, instead of using as dependent variable the vote share relative to the total number of votes
cast, we use the share relative to the total number of eligible voters (which is very much stable over
time); this allows us to control for the negative impact on turnout documented above. This second
set of results suggest that what looked like a gain for the two mainstream coalitions, was not coming
from an increase in electoral consensus, but, rather, from a stable electoral consensus accounting for
a larger share of a smaller pool of total votes. In terms of changes in actual electoral performance, the
23 In addition, those patterns are interesting in and of themselves: as an across-the-board drop in turnout could
have very different political implications from a scenario in which different parties or coalitions are affected
differently. This can obviously speak to the question of whether the internet has operated as a polarizing
force or not, on which there has been much debate and relatively conflicting evidence (Sunstein, 2009;
Hindman, 2009; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011)
24 Appendix Table A.6 reports the breakdown of the results for each of the main parties in the two mainstream
coalitions, and for each of the main groups of outsider parties. For the definitions of coalitions, see Ap-
pendix Table A.7. The Italian system has a large number of parties, with new ones forming and old ones
merging and dissolving very often; by the same token, the main coalitions are led by the same forces over
this period, but their membership varies drastically across election cycles. For each election, we take the
main center-right and center-left coalitions, and define all parties that do not belong to either as outsiders,
with the exceptions of the M5S and Monti coalition in 2013. Table A.8 describes how the different party
labels in Table A.6 map onto different parties in different elections, because of mergers.
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most distinctive impact of the introduction of broadband is certainly the negative impact on votes for
outsider parties.25
The fact that those who seem to drop out are the supporters of outsider parties – which include those
more at the extremes of the ideological spectrum, such as the unreformed Communists – suggests that
the fall in turnout is due to more subtle reasons than a simple reduction in the consumption of political
information. To further explore this aspect, we use data from the Italian National Election Study
(ITANES), a series of electoral surveys conducted on a representative sample of the Italian population
in coincidence with national parliamentary elections. We focus in particular on the 2001 wave, which
interviewed 3,209 individuals and included various questions on self-reported voting choice, political
participation, and media consumption. Based on this information we construct measures of “Interest
in Politics”, “Political Activism”, and “Political Information”, and look at differences along these
dimensions between voters of different parties and coalitions.26
Figure 7 presents the results, comparing the averages for voters who reported to have voted for either
of the mainstream coalitions, and for outsider parties (variables are standardized, so that magnitudes
correspond to standard deviations of each of the variables). The comparison suggests that voters
of outsider parties are among the most interested in and informed about politics, and certainly the
most politically active.27 This evidence seems hard to reconcile with the view that the effect of
broadband would be operating through demobilization induced by reduced information since those
voters are unlikely to be the ones disproportionately switching into online entertainment. All in all,
this suggests that the depressing effect of broadband internet on turnout in national elections was
driven by the disengagement of individuals who were already disappointed with mainstream politics.
If that is the case, the initial impact of broadband constituted an opportunity for political entrepreneurs
who could target that disenchanted audience.
This message is reinforced by the results on the electoral performance of different parties and coali-
tions in 2013, reported in Table 7, estimated using votes per eligible voters as dependent variable.28
In columns 1 and 2 we see that old-fashioned mainstream coalitions and outsider parties did not
gain from the reversal in the initial drop in turnout. Instead, increased turnout benefited new political
forces, and especially the M5S (column 3). The strong positive effect of longer exposure to broadband
on support for M5S, in particular, is consistent with the fact that Grillo’s movement relied crucially
on the Internet for its organization and, later, for its campaign effort. Interestingly, the M5S was not
the only one to benefit from the Internet’s mobilization potential. First, another new “web-friendly”
political movement, “Fare per Fermare il Declino” (henceforth Fare), was also able to leverage the
25 This effect was particularly pronounced on the extreme left, as shown in Appendix Table A.6.
26 More information on how these variables were constructed is reported in the notes to Figure 7.
27 The party breakdown (available upon request) shows that the unreformed Communists, which represent the
bulk of outsider voters in 2001, score particularly high in all three dimensions.
28 Note that we attribute zeroes to the parties or movements that were not on the ballot in 2001, such as the
M5S. This means that the identification in those cases is less clean, since it is coming essentially from the
cross-sectional variation.
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effect of the Internet, though to a much more limited extent than the M5S (column 4).29 This further
supports the view that the supply-side of the political system did react to the initial shock represented
by the diffusion of high-speed internet and the subsequent emergence of a pool of “connected” but
disenchanted individuals. We also find a relatively mild positive effect in favor of the new centrist
force led by former prime minister Mario Monti; this results suggests that, more generally, Internet
may have offered greater visibility to new comers than traditional media.30
In sum, the evidence presented suggests quite clearly that the initial negative effect of broadband
internet on political participation in national elections was driven by individuals who were relatively
engaged and informed about politics to begin with, but disenchanted with mainstream political of-
ferings. By the same token, its reversal benefited new political forces which emerged presumably in
response to the incentives posed by that initial effect.
6.2. OTHER FORMS OF PARTICIPATION: ONLINE PLATFORMS AND THE RISE OF THE
FIVE-STAR MOVEMENT (M5S)
We now turn to the question of what happened between the initial negative impact of broadband on
turnout and its reversal. Specifically, can we find evidence that those who presumably dropped out
of the mainstream political process may have remained politically active in other ways? Can we
establish a link between those other ways and the eventual reversal? For that we look at other forms
of political engagement that were going on in the intervening years, both online and offline, beyond
mainstream national elections. Fortunately, the Italian political system, and its evolution in recent
years, offers a number of windows into those different patterns.
6.2.1. ONLINE ACTIVITY AND THE M5S
We start by looking at the effects of broadband access on electoral participation on a notable measure
of online political activity: the evolution of the local grassroots protest groups inspired by Beppe
Grillo on the online media platform Meetup.com. As discussed in Section 3.2.1, these groups con-
stituted an important springboard in the expansion of the M5S, and in the eventual creation of M5S-
affiliated electoral lists at the local level. It is not unreasonable to expect that the presence of these
online protest groups would be enhanced by the diffusion of broadband internet - although one may
wonder whether the disengagement opportunities offered by the internet, in the form of entertainment
and different kinds of information, could negate that impulse.
29 This movement was co-founded by a group of US-based academic economists. Most importantly, similarly
to the M5S, it also exploited a blog as its springboard (namely, noiseFromAmerika.org, founded in 2006).
However, the party suffered with a political scandal regarding the qualification of its political leader just
before the elections, which naturally detracted from its performance. Its average share of votes was a mere
0.7%, though it did get a significant share (up to 29%) in a few localities.
30 The Monti-led party could also be considered, to a lesser extent, an Internet-savvy movement. Indeed,
Monti announced his intention to actively enter into the political arena on Twitter on December 26, 2012,
and made extensive use of this platform, reaching in a couple of months more than 240,000 followers.
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To check for that, we construct a novel and comprehensive data set with information on the formation
and membership of all local Meetup.com groups associated with the Beppe Grillo-led protest move-
ment, which would eventually coalesce into the M5S. Specifically, for each municipality, we know
whether, by 2012, one such group existed and, if so, the date at which it was originally created. Un-
fortunately, this means that we cannot use the time variation induced by the pre- vs. post-2001 break-
down. We thus have to focus on the variation across municipalities - hence excluding the municipality
fixed effects and instrumenting Broadbandm,t using Distance_UGSm. As a result, the identification
here is not as clean as when we can actually use the time variation within municipalities. To improve
on that, we include both province and SLL fixed effects – hence identifying the effect from compar-
ing municipalities within a very small area – and control for a range of municipal geographic and
demographic characteristics.31 Our identification assumption would now have to be more stringent
than before, requiring that the distribution of UGS within provinces and SLLs is as good as random,
once we control for these characteristics. In light of this, we will refrain from pushing any causal
interpretation of our estimated coefficients.
In addition, we also have information on the number of members of Meetup.com groups between
2005 and 2012 across the entire sample of Italian municipalities (we normalize membership in each
municipality by 1,000 inhabitants).32 In this case there is time variation, and we can set the number
at zero for the pre-broadband period of 2001. Still, the relevant variation is again coming from the
post-broadband period only, and caution is still needed in interpreting the results.
Table 8 reports the results, using IV specifications. The first column uses as dependent variable the
time since the creation of the first local group, as of 2012, to examine whether broadband access is
associated with earlier group formation. The results confirm that in municipalities that had earlier
access to broadband internet indeed groups tended to form earlier. In column 2 we then look at the
panel variation in membership. We see that these groups also tended to have more members in places
where broadband arrived earlier.
We should emphasize that, while this pattern is not exactly surprising, it is not as obvious as it might
appear. Indeed, there is no deterministic relationship between broadband access and an increase in
online participation in political activities. That is, the idea that broadband access leads individuals
to participate online even in this specific type of activity is a hypothesis rather than a fact. Our
31 Demographic characteristics include: education (% population with a bachelor degree), age structure (%
population under 25 and % population over 65), and number of firms per capita. Geographic controls
include: distance from closest provincial capital, altimetric zone, dummy for mountainous area, dummy for
coastal municipality, distance of the municipality’s centroid from the coast, area, and terrain ruggedness
index.
32 We should stress that it is possible for an individual to be a member of multiple local groups, including in
localities other than the one where she lives. To the extent that there exists an effect of broadband access on
the existence of local groups, this possibility of multiple membership would magnify the difference between
localities with extensive and limited access; we would argue that this magnified effect corresponds to the
true impact of broadband access. In any event, the data on the date of formation of the groups should not
be affected by multiple membership.
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results provide support to this hypothesis by showing that the use of online platforms for political
mobilization is indeed related to the diffusion of broadband internet access.
Most importantly, in light of the connection between these online groups and the creation and ex-
pansion of the M5S movement, the results in Table 8 immediately beg the question of whether the
diffusion of broadband access impacted the performance of that movement, once it started taking part
in the electoral process. This would provide direct evidence that the kind of political entrepreneur-
ship exemplified by the M5S indeed eventually developed the ability to translate the new mobilization
tools into electoral participation and results.
For that we look at data on local elections. Municipal elections in Italy take place typically every five
years, in staggered fashion so that every year has some elections taking place; we consider elections
between 2001 and 2012, leaving aside the elections between 2002 and 2004, because the data on
ADSL penetration is unavailable for those years.
Table 9 displays the results. In column 1 we see that municipalities with better access to broadband
were more likely to have the M5S on the ballot, consistent with the idea that the creation of local
Meetup.com groups translated into an M5S electoral presence at the local level. Note that, as we
focus on more recent years, the fact that our ADSL coverage data goes only up until 2011 leads us
to drop a lot of useful information from 2012. In light of that, we also show a specification with
“Years Since Good Broadband” as our key independent variable, which lets us include those 2012
elections (column 2).33 Finally, in columns 3 and 4 we estimate the same two specifications using
as dependent variable the share of votes obtained by M5S candidates (as a share of eligible voters);
consistent with the previous findings, these results confirm that, in places with stronger and earlier
broadband diffusion, M5S candidates’ electoral performance was significantly better.34
The evidence presented suggest that the emergence of new political forces – likely in tandem with the
evolution of the Internet itself, with the rise of social media and user-generated content – may have
substantially changed the effect of broadband access on political engagement. Still, the empirical
variation that underlies these results is unavoidably narrow, coming from a small and select group of
places: the number of municipalities with the M5S on the ballot is rather small, and they tend to be
relatively large in terms of population. As such, the variation is coming from a small and select group
of places, and again we cannot control for unobservable characteristics at the municipal level.
33 The number of municipalities with M5S presence is 17 (2008), 51 (2009), 11 (2010), 78 (2011), and 103
(2012); the number of elections was 610, 4284, 1072, 1338, and 1006, respectively. The measure of years
of good broadband coverage includes some inevitable additional measurement error for 2012.
34 As for the impact of broadband on turnout in municipal elections, we find no robust result. Note that here
we have variation coming from a small number of municipalities, since most localities did not have more
than one election in the years of our sample (2001 and 2005-2011). This means that our coefficient is rather
imprecisely estimated, and the first-stage relationship is much weaker than was the case in Table 2.
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6.2.2. REFERENDA
The M5S results are an indication that the diffusion of broadband internet did not have a simple
negative effect on political participation. In fact, the idea that it actually had a positive impact on other
forms of engagement is further bolstered by looking at participation in popular referenda referenda.
As discussed in Section —, referenda have a peculiar role in Italian politics, as they can be called
without the concurrence - and often under the active hostility - of mainstream parties. As such, they
are often viewed as a form of political engagement at the margins of the mainstream political process.
We have data on the referenda held in 2009 and 2011, both of which were, in fact, either ignored or
opposed by mainstream parties and traditional media alike. This means that, once again, we cannot
use the time variation induced by the pre- vs. post-2001 breakdown; hence, as for the municipal elec-
tions, we instrument Broadbandm,t using Distance_UGSm, include province and SLL fixed effects,
demographic and geographic municipal controls, and cluster standard errors at the province level. We
present the results separately for the 2009 and the 2011 referenda (similar results are obtained if we
pool data for the two years together and include year fixed effects).
The results, for both the OLS and the IV specifications, are reported in Table 10. What we see
is a strikingly different pattern relative to the national elections: a statistically significant positive
association between broadband diffusion and turnout.
We cannot directly compare magnitudes with the coefficients in Table 2, not only because we cannot
replicate our original identification strategy, but also because turnout in referenda is, of course, of a
peculiar nature; indeed, minimum turnout requirements for enactment naturally imply that abstention
essentially counts as a “No” vote. However, as noted above, this means that the mainstream parties,
particularly the center-right coalition, were in many cases actively trying to keep turnout low. The
positive association with turnout thus suggests that the internet had a rather damaging effect on the
support for the mainstream parties (and especially the center-right) when it comes to the referenda, in
a very different direction than what found for the national elections.
7. DISCUSSION
7.1. INTERPRETING THE ITALIAN EVIDENCE
The main takeaway from our results is that the impact of broadband Internet was rather nuanced.
In particular, it varied across different forms of political participation and, quite crucially, also over
time, consistent with the demand and supply sides of politics reacting endogenously to the increasing
challenges and opportunities posed by the diffusion of the new medium.
We have documented that, at first, the introduction of broadband Internet across Italian municipalities
was associated with a decline in political participation in the form of electoral turnout in national
parliamentary elections. Our conceptual framework suggests, however, that this should be best inter-
preted as merely the immediate, partial-equilibrium effect of the change in media technology. Indeed,
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the initial drop in electoral participation was counteracted by rather distinct effects on other forms of
political engagement, both online and offline. First, we provide evidence that early access to the Inter-
net facilitated the emergence and expansion of local grassroots online protest groups. Second, it was
also positively associated with higher turnout in popular referenda, which are largely boycotted by
mainstream parties and tend to have a very distinct, more anti-establishment flavor than parliamentary
elections. This pattern suggests that, while the Internet may have operated in the short run as a “de-
mobilizing” force with regard to participation in mainstream elections, the same was not necessarily
the case for political engagement more broadly.
What is more, our findings document how these new forms of mobilization seem to have eventually
fed back into the mainstream electoral process. This process is exemplified most clearly by the emer-
gence of the M5S, which, to a large extent, grew out of those local online groups and, in due course,
turned into a potent electoral force. Our results show that, once it started competing in elections, the
M5S was able to leverage the expansion of broadband access into better outcomes – as was the case,
to a lesser extent, with other web-friendly newcomers. Their success strongly suggests that the initial
demobilization, coupled with the possibilities offered by the new media platform, presented an op-
portunity that new, Internet-savvy political entrepreneurs were able to seize to enhance mobilization.
Once this supply-side reaction had taken place, the initial negative effect on parliamentary election
turnout was largely reversed.
This pattern is very much consistent with the exit, voice, loyalty framework discussed in Section 2.
This is first underscored by the fact that it was the outsider parties, whose supporters one would have
deemed more likely to exit, that essentially lost voters in the immediate aftermath of the introduc-
tion of broadband. In addition, the M5S, and to a lesser extent other similar forces, encapsulate the
Internet’s potential to transition from exit device to a novel source of voice within mainstream pol-
itics. These were typically movements that initially emerged outside and in explicit repudiation of
mainstream politics, and that eventually gravitated toward taking part in it. In that sense, this consti-
tutes another mechanism for what Hirschman called the “influence and power that come from ‘having
nowhere to go” (1970, p.73): disenchanted voters opting for exit from mainstream politics became the
driving force of a political movement that eventually punished the political forces that had disaffected
them, through that movement’s strong impact on mainstream politics.
In fact, it is rather clear from the survey evidence that the M5S has fished into the pool of demobilized
voters. People who did not vote in the 2008 national elections are largely overrepresented among
M5S voters compared to other parties: one out of seven people who voted for the M5S in 2012 local
elections reported to have abstained in the 2008 parliamentary elections; the overall figure is only one
out of fifteen (Pedrazzani and Pinto, 2013).
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7.2. ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS
There could also be alternative interpretations for these demand-side movements, beyond the role of
disenchantment. The initial drop in turnout, for instance, is evidently consistent with the existing lit-
erature on the effects of new media technologies, which has underlined how they may sometimes have
negative effects on political participation. The usual explanation is related to the potential crowding-
out of the consumption of existing media sources that placed a greater weight on relevant political
information. The pool of demobilized voters surely contained many purely apathetic citizens, likely
to tune out of political information when given the chance.
There is strong evidence, however, that the initial demobilization was indeed associated with disen-
chantment rather than pure apathy. First, we have documented that the drop in turnout was mostly
linked to supporters of outsider parties, and unreformed Communists in particular, who tend to report
relatively high levels of interest in politics and news consumption. Second, a pure apathy story would
not lead us to expect other forms of participation to be enhanced by the Internet, as found in the data.
Additional evidence in that regard comes from looking at the socio-demographic characteristics of
M5S voters. They typically have a medium-to-high level of instruction, and are generally well-
informed about politics (Pedrazzani and Pinto, 2013). Rather unsurprisingly, M5S voters were also
heavy Internet users: 80% of M5S voters access the Internet and 42% use it as their main source of
news (compared with a population average of 61% and 26%, respectively). They are also more likely
to express political opinions on websites or social media, and to visit websites of party or candidates
(Mosca and Vaccari, 2013). In sum, these are to a large extent “people who have resources to be active
and the willingness to do it but that find high barriers to entry into the traditional channels of politi-
cal participation” (Passarelli, Tronconi, and Tuorto, 2013, p.130); people whose electoral abstention
seems to be driven by protest rather than apathy (Tuorto, 2006).
Their anti-establishment profile is also apparent from direct survey evidence that M5S voters are more
prone to opining that voting is useless, and that political parties are not necessary in a democracy. It
is also supported by the evidence we find of a positive impact of broadband internet on political
participation in the context of direct democracy: since the national referenda analyzed have been
largely ignored or boycotted by mainstream political parties, that positive impact is likely to have
involved voters dissatisfied with mainstream politics.
At the same time, the coordinating role of the Internet might also have been complemented by an
informational one, thus amplifying its effects. For example, Bailard (2012) shows that, in a weakly-
institutionalized environment, the Internet may also foster disenchantment, by increasing the citizens’
level of information about an electoral system perceived as disreputable. By the same token, Chong,
De la O, Karlan, and Wantchekon (2012) point out that an exogenous increase in the level of infor-
mation about incumbent politicians’ misbehavior may translate into lower levels of electoral partic-
ipation. Hence, in a political system widely perceived as dysfunctional, such as that of Italy in the
2000s, Internet may have also boosted the short-run exit (and then its long-run conversion into voice)
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via an information channel.
7.3. EXTERNAL VALIDITY
A final question is whether we should expect the pattern we have detected in the case of Italy to be
repeated in other contexts. There is good reason to think this could be the case.
Our conceptual framework suggests that the reversal should be expected once two main ingredi-
ents combine. First, the presence of a strong contingent of citizens who are dissatisfied with main-
stream political forces, but not disengaged from politics in general. This phenomenon seems rather
widespread, judging by recent trends observed in other countries. In particular, over recent decades
voter turnout has decreased in many advanced democracies (Franklin, 2004) – a process that, many
have argued, has been accompanied by an increase in the extent of public dissatisfaction with the
performance and institutions of representative democracy (Pharr, Putnam, and Dalton, 2000; Dalton,
2004). The second ingredient is the fact that the Internet is a mobilization and coordination platform
with relatively low barriers to entry, which is obviously not specific to the Italian case either. While
the first ingredient implies that there will be an incentive for political entrepreneurs to jump into the
electoral arena, the second one ensures that they will have an effective tool for doing that.
While more evidence is certainly in order, there are examples from other countries which seem prima
facie compatible with this logic. For example, in the US, Howard Dean, Barack Obama and the Tea
Party all represent underdogs who fished into different pools of voters who were disenchanted with
mainstream politics, and who have used Internet as a coordination device to mobilize them.35 Similar
examples from other countries may include the so-called “pirate parties” (Scandinavia, Germany),
Yesh Atid (Israel), Alexei Navalny (Russia) and Rede Sustentabilidade (Brazil), with different degrees
of success in influencing mainstream elections.
These examples also make clear that the aforementioned ingredients are likely to interact with in-
stitutional characteristics, so that specific patterns will differ depending on context. For instance, in
a two-party system like the US, with very high barriers for third-party candidates, the role of the
Internet in helping newcoming political entrepreneurs seems to have taken place within mainstream
parties (via primary elections). This is rather different from what happened in Italy, with its relatively
open proportional-representation system. As another example, in a relatively authoritarian regime
in which one party exerts overwhelming influence over pre-existing media, the Internet might repre-
sent the only news source available for alternative points of view (see Miner, 2012, for the case of
Malaysia).36 In this more fragile institutional context, the informative role of the Internet as a source
of news is likely to have a more relevant impact. The role of such institutional features on the specific
timing and shape of the effect of the Internet on political participation is an exciting avenue for future
research.
35 For some evidence in the case of the US, see Larcinese and Miner (2012) and Jaber (2013).
36 Berlusconi’s influence notwithstanding, this was not exactly the case in Italy (Durante and Knight (2012)).
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Figure 1: Evolution of Broadband Access and Penetration in Italian Municipalities
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The figure reports the evolution of ADSL availability (top panel) and In-
ternet penetration (share of households with an ADSL subscription, bottom
panel), between 2000 and 2011; the dashed vertical lines indicate national
elections years (2001, 2006, and 2008). Source: Between (2006, 2008) for
ADSL access, and Between (2006, 2008) and AGCOM (2008-2012) for In-
ternet penetration.
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Figure 2: Geographical Distribution of ADSL Access in 2005
The figure illustrates the distribution of ADSL access across Italian municipalities at the end of 2005 on the
6-point scale used in our data, with darker colors indicating no or low access and lighter colors indicating high
or full access. Source: Between.
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Figure 3: ADSL Coverage (2006) by Distance to Closest UGS
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The figure reports the average ADSL access score (from 0 to 5) in 2006 for munici-
palities located at various distances from the closest UGS (from 0-5 km to 40 km or
more). Source: Between.
Figure 4: Difference in Turnout between early- and late-Internet municipalities
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Difference in turnout between early and late-internet municipalities
The figure reports the difference in average turnout in the national elections hold in
1996, 2001 (before the diffusion of ADSL, in light grey) and in 2006, 2008 and 2013
(after, in dark grey) between municipalities that had access to ADSL in 2005 (the first
year for which data are available) and municipalities that still did not have access to
ADSL in 2008.
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Figure 5: Turnout by Election Year
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The figure reports the residual of a regression of electoral turnout in the four national
elections between 1996 and 2013 on year fixed effects separately for municipalities located
3km or less (top panel) and 30km or more (bottom) from the closest UGS.
Figure 6: Coefficient from Reduced-Form Regression of Turnout on Distance from Closest UGS (1996-2013)
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The figure reports the estimated coefficient from a regression of electoral turnout on
distance from the closest UGS separately for the two pre-broadband elections (1996 and
2001, in light grey) and for the three post-broadband elections (2006, 2008 and 2013,
in dark grey). All regressions include province and local labor market fixed effects as
well as the entire set of controls described in our empirical section.
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Figure 7: Interest in Politics, Political Activism and Political Information by Voting Choice
(2001)
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The figure reports the average standardized score in the measures “Interest in Politics”, “Political Activism”
and “Political Information” separately for voters of the two mainstream coalitions (Center-Right and Center-
Left), and of outsider parties. The measures are based on responses to questions included in the 2001
wave of the Italian National Election Study. The variable “Interest in Politics” is based on responses to
the question “Generally speaking, are you very interested, fairly interested, a little interested or not at all
interested in politics?”, with the score recoded as increasing from 0 (“Not at all”) to 4 (“Very much”). The
variable “Political Activism” is derived from the responses to the following set of questions, by computing
the first principal component: “I shall now read a list of things people sometimes do to participate in political
life. Please, tell me whether you happened to make any of these things in the last 4-5 years (Yes or No): 1.
Signing for law proposals or referenda; 2. Signing in favour of a candidate’s or a list’s presence in the ballot;
3. Sending letters or complains to public authority; 4. Writing a letter to a newspaper; 5. Participating in
a political debate; 6. Participating in a demonstration; 7. Donating money to a candidate, a party or a
party’s paper; 8. Spending time or work for a party; 9. Attempting to persuade somebody (including family
members) to vote for a party or a candidate”. Finally, the variable “Political Information” is derived from
the responses to the following set of questions, again by computing the first principal component: “Now, I
shall read a list of things people did during the last election campaign. For each of them, please tell me if
you happened to do it or not. And if you did it, did you do it with interest or without it? 1. Listening radio
programs about the elections; 2. Watching television programs about the elections; 3. Reading articles
in newspapers or magazines on the elections; 4. Participating in public speeches and meetings about the
elections; 5. Reading Internet websites about the elections; 6. Looking at posters about the elections;
7.Watching TV parties’ advertisements; 8. Reading flyers or propaganda letters found in my mailbox”.
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Table 1: Short-run effect of Internet on Exit and Voice
Voter types High Engagement Low Engagement
High Satisfaction
Voice Exit
(Entertainment)
Low Satisfaction
Exit Exit
(Non-Mainstream Politics) (Entertainment)
Table 2: Broadband and Turnout in National Lower House Elections: “Short-Run” Effects (1996-2008)
Dep. Variable: Turnout (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV IV IV IV IV
Broadband Access
-0.0043*** -0.0274*** -0.0145*** -0.0151*** -0.0151* -0.0150*
[0.0006] [0.0038] [0.0045] [0.0053] [0.0089] [0.0090]
Demographics I ×
Yes Yes Yes
Time Polynomial
Demographics II ×
Yes
Time Polynomial
Demographics I ×
Yes
Post-2001
Demographics I ×
Yes
Year FEs
First-Stage F-statistic 63.1 40.1 49.1 17.5 17.5
Observations 31876 31876 31876 31876 31876 31876
Number of Municipalities 7969 7969 7969 7969 7969 7969
Years: 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008. All regressions include municipality and region-year fixed effects, and control for contempo-
raneous population. Standard errors clustered by province. Instrumental Variable: Distance from Closest UGS X Post-2001
dummy. Demographic Controls I (2001): Population, % Population 20 to 34, % Population over 65, Urbanization; Demo-
graphic Controls II: % Population with Diploma Laurea, Firms per capita, Distance from Closest Provincial Capital. Time
Polynomial: 4th order polynomial in time. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 4: Broadband and Turnout in National Lower House Elections: “Long-Run” Effects (2013)
Dep. Variable: Turnout (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV IV IV IV IV IV
Broadband Access
0.0150 0.0187
[0.0159] [0.0167]
Years Since Good Broadband
0.0086 0.0105
[0.0088] [0.0090]
Full Access
0.0640
[0.0673]
Some Access
0.0869
[0.0940]
Non-Urban Only X X
First-Stage F-statistic 13.0 13.6 13.5 15.3 12.8 11.5
Observations 23907 21207 23907 21207 23907 23907
Number of Municipalities 7969 7069 7969 7069 7969 7969
Years: 1996, 2001, 2013. All regressions include municipality and region-year fixed effects, control for contemporane-
ous population, and demographic controls (as of 2001) interacted with a 4th order polynomial in time. Standard errors
clustered by province. Instrumental Variable: Distance from Closest UGS X Post-2001 dummy. Demographic Controls
(2001): Population, % Population 20 to 34, % Population over 65, Urbanization. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 5: Broadband and Turnout in National Lower House Elections: Full Sample (1996-2013)
Dep. Variable: Turnout (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV IV IV IV IV
Broadband Access
-0.0038*** -0.0256*** -0.0226*** -0.0238*** -0.0072 -0.0073
[0.0005] [0.0045] [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0100] [0.0101]
Demographics I × Yes
Yes Yes
Time Polynomial
Demographics II ×
Yes
Time Polynomial
Demographics I ×
Yes
Post-2001
Demographics I ×
Yes
Year FEs
First-Stage F-statistic 59.9 56.9 64.1 17.9 17.8
Observations 39845 39845 39845 39845 39845 39845
Number of Municipalities 7969 7969 7969 7969 7969 7969
Years: 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013. All regressions include municipality and region-year fixed effects, and control for
contemporaneous population. Standard errors clustered by province. Instrumental Variable: Distance from Closest UGS X
Post-2001 dummy. Demographic Controls I (2001): Population, % Population 20 to 34, % Population over 65, Urbanization;
Demographic Controls II: % Population with Diploma Laurea, Firms per capita, Distance from Closest Provincial Capital.
Time Polynomial: 4th order polynomial in time. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 6: Broadband and Coalition Performance: 2001 and 2008 (IV Results)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Center-Right Center-Left Outsiders
0.0086 0.0115* -0.0287***
Vote Share
[0.0091] [0.0062] [0.0119]
(Mean Vote Share 2001) 0.516 0.320 0.150
Votes per eligible voters
-0.0057 0.0017 -0.0237***
[0.0053] [0.0051] [0.0089]
(Mean Votes per eligible voter 2001) 0.375 0.232 0.107
Observations 15938 15938 15938
Number of Municipalities 7969 7969 7969
Years: 2001 and 2008. Reported coefficients are for Broadband Access. All regressions include mu-
nicipality and region-year fixed effects, control for contemporaneous population, and demographic
controls (as of 2001) interacted with a 4th order polynomial in time. Standard errors clustered by
province. Instrumental Variable: Distance from Closest UGS X Post-2001 dummy. Demographic
Controls (2001): Population, % Population 20 to 34, % Population over 65, Urbanization. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 7: Broadband and Coalition Performance in National Elections: 2001 and 2013 (IV Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Votes per eligible voter M5S Mainstream Outsiders Fare Monti
Years Since Good Broadband
0.0257*** -0.0138 -0.0145*** 0.0021*** 0.0082**
[0.0072] [0.0086] [0.0054] [0.0006] [0.0037]
Mean (2013) 0.170 0.430 0.035 0.007 0.060
Observations 15938 15938 15938 15938 15938
Municipalities 7969 7969 7969 7969 7969
Years: 2001 and 2013. Reported coefficients are for Broadband Access. All regressions include municipality
and region-year fixed effects, control for contemporaneous population, and demographic controls (as of 2001)
interacted with a 4th order polynomial in time. Standard errors clustered by province. Instrumental Variable:
Distance from Closest UGS X Post-2001 dummy. Demographic Controls (2001): Population, % Population
20 to 34, % Population over 65, Urbanization. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Table 8: Broadband and Formation of Beppe Grillo/M5S Meetup.com Groups (IV Results)
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Log Days since Formation Members per 1000
Broadband Access
1.2838*** 0.1253***
[0.4647] [0.0445]
Years 2012 2001, 2005-2011
Demographic Controls (2001) Yes
Province and SLL FEs Yes
Demographics × Time Polynomial Yes
Municipality and Region-Year FEs Yes
First-Stage F-statistic 12.4 78.7
Observations 8066 64680
Number of Municipalities 8085
Log Days since Formation: Log (1 + Days since Formation of First Group). Members per 1000: Num-
ber of Affiliates per 1000 Inhabitants. Instrumental Variable: Distance from Closest UGS (Column
(1)), Distance from Closest UGS X Post-2001 (Column (2)). Demographic controls (2001): Popu-
lation, % Population 20 to 34, % Population over 65, Urbanization, % of Population with Diploma
Laurea, Firms per capita, Distance from Closest Provincial Capital. Standard errors are clustered at
the province level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 9: Broadband, Turnout, and M5S Results in Municipal Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable:
M5S M5S M5S Votes M5S Votes
on Ballot on Ballot per eligible voters per eligible voters
Broadband Access
0.0749*** 0.0018**
[0.0237] [0.0008]
Years Since Good Broadband
0.1198** 0.0030**
[0.0484] [0.0014]
Observations 7299 7299 7299 7299
Years: 2008-2011 (Columns (1)-(2)), 2008-2012 (Columns (3)-(4)). IV Regressions. All regressions include
year, provincce, and SLL fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. Instrumental
Variable: Distance from Closest UGS. Demographic controls (2001) Population, % Population 20 to 34,
% Population over 65, Urbanization, % Population with Diploma Laurea, Firms per capita, Distance from
Closest Provincial Capital. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 10: Broadband and Turnout in National Referenda (2009, 2011)
Dependent Variable: Turnout (1) (2) (3) (4)
2009 2011
OLS IV OLS IV
Broadband Access
0.0006 0.0210* 0.0016*** 0.0189*
[0.0005] [0.0123] [0.0005] [0.0098]
First-Stage F-statistic 19.4 37.2
Observations 8085 8085 8085 8085
Years: 2009 and 2011. All regressions include province and SLL fixed effects, standard errors
clustered at province level. Turnout = average turnout across four referendum questions. In-
strumental Variable: Distance from Closest UGS. Demographic controls (2001): Population, %
Population 20 to 34, % Population over 65, Urbanization, % Population with Diploma Laurea,
Firms per capita, Distance from Closest Provincial Capital. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics - Time-invariant variables
Mean S.d. Min Max
Demographics I
Share of population 20-34 0.20 0.03 0.05 0.32
Share of population over 65 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.64
Urbanization 1.61 0.68 1 3
Demographics II
Share of graduates 0.26 0.061 0.051 0.71
Firms per capita 924 1981 0.04 76918
Distance to closest province capital 23.48 13.32 0 209.80
Instrument
Distance to the closest UGS 14.10 8.93 0 212.02
Notes. Means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values with the corresponding number of obser-
vations are reported for all demographic variables used in the empirical analysis.
Table A.4: Broadband, Turnout, and Demographic Characteristics: Pairwise Correlations
Broadband Access (1) (2)
2006 2008
Turnout 0.018 0.055
Population (1000’s) 0.114 0.060
% Population 20 to 34 0.262 0.152
% Population over 65 -0.333 -0.223
Urbanization 0.415 0.232
% Population with Diploma Laurea 0.320 0.197
Firms per capita -0.224 -0.130
Distance Provincial Capital -0.156 -0.106
Observations 7969 7969
Pairwise correlations with Broadband Access. p-values are 0.000
for all variables.
Table A.5: Broadband, Turnout, and Demographic Characteristics: OLS Regressions
Dep. Variable: Broadband Access (1) (2) (3)
Turnout 0.0018*** 0.0002 -0.00006
[0.0004] [0.0003] [0.00029]
Population (1000’s) -0.00006** -0.00008**
[0.00003] [0.00003]
% Population 20 to 34 -0.1034** -0.0835**
[0.0426] [0.0420]
% Population over 65 -0.2766*** -0.2611***
[0.0229] [0.0224]
Urbanization 0.0029 -0.0008
[0.0019] [0.0017]
% Population with Diploma Laurea 0.0732***
[0.0171]
Firms per capita 0.000002***
[0.0000003]
Distance Provincial Capital -0.0003***
[0.0001]
Observations 7969 7969 7969
R-squared 0.542 0.584 0.591
OLS regressions. Data for broadband access and turnout refer to electoral year 2008; all other
variables refer to census year 2001. All regressions include province fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the province level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Figure A.1: Log Population by Election Year
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The figure reports the residual of a regression of population between 1996 and 2013
on year fixed effects separately for municipalities located 3km or less (top panel) and
30km or more (bottom) from the closest UGS.
APPENDIX B: TECHNICAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON ITALY’S BROADBAND
INFRASTRUCTURE (ONLINE ONLY)
The average length of the Italian primary distribution network, running from the “Main Distribution
Frames” (MDFs) in the local telecommunication exchange (i.e., the “Central Office”, CO) to the
street cabinets (SDFs) is 1.3km. The average length of the secondary distribution network, running
from the street cabinets (SDFs) to the buildings, is 0.47km.37 Indeed, the length of “local loops” does
not seem to be a crucial parameter determining the absence of ADSL access by Italian municipalities
even in 2011. Specifically, our data shows that 3/4 of municipalities that did not yet have access to
ADSL in 2011 are less than 4 kilometers away from the closest CO.
In order to provide a comprehensive picture of the Italian broadband network, it is also important
to point out that in addition to deploying optical fiber cables between the CO serving the munici-
pality and the closest UGS, telecommunication operators had to meet another technical requirement.
Specifically, in order to be able to offer ADSL services to the municipality: it also needs to install a
DSLAM (Digital Subscriber Line Multiplexer) within the Central Office. However, the installation
cost of the DSLAM is remarkably lower with respect to the cost of connecting the CO to the UGS
using optical fiber (Between, 2006; AGCOM, 2008-2012).38 Indeed, (AGCOM, 2011) distinguish
between areas of “medium-run” and “ short-run” digital divide. Municipalities served by a CO whose
connection to the UGS is still implemented via copper wires (i.e., not connected with optical fiber)
belong to the first category. Municipalities served by a central office connected with optical fiber to
the UGS but still lacking a DSLAM, belong to the second category.
For what concerns mobile broadband, the data available at the regional and provincial level show
that the pattern of its coverage resembles the one of fixed broadband. That is, the regions/provinces
characterized by a lower degree of ADSL availability are also the ones with the lower coverage of
mobile broadband (Between 2008). Similarly, in terms of connection speed, the digital divide on
the mobile connection side follows the very same pattern as the one concerning fixed broadband.
For example, the download speed in smaller municipalities (i.e., below 2000 inhabitants) is around
half with respect to that of metropolitan areas (Between, 2010). Moreover, a large share of mobile
37 According to other estimates by Telecom Italia the actual average distances are even lower, 1.1km and
0.4 km for the primary and secondary distribution network, respectively. In Metropolitan areas the average
length of the primary distribution network is 0.9km. Moreover during the 1988-1992 the telecommunication
incumbent operator, Telecom Italia, invested significant resources in renovating and improving its copper
distribution network (Impiglia, Laurenti, Magnone, and Persico, 2004).
38 In 2008, the cost of installing optical fiber cables was estimated to be around 4,000 Euros per kilometer in
small cities and 1,0000 Euros per kilometer in larger ones (i.e., requiring larger cables) in Italy. In addition
to the fiber cable costs per se, the cost of digging the trenches and the costs of municipal licenses represent
other relevant costs necessary to install optical fiber cables (Ciapanna and Sabbatini (2008)). The cost of
installing a DSLAM in a central office varies according to the number of lines served. However, the overall
cost of installing a DSLAM in an CO is in the range of few thousands euros (AGCOM 2011).
connections are based on “pay-as-you-go” type of contracts (around 76%) which usually have a cap
in terms of either the maximum amount of downloadable data or in terms of time that could be spent
surfing the web (AGCOM, 2012). Indeed, while the bandwidth available to the end user in the case
of fixed broadband corresponds to her “dedicated” one through her own copper wire, in the case of
mobile connection the bandwidth of the end user has to be shared with everyone else using the same
mobile cell. Thus, while the users of fixed line broadband experience a good average bandwidth
speed, this is not the case for the ones using mobile connections. Hence, the differences between the
type of contracts typically observed in the fixed and mobile broadband markets, “flat” and “pay-as-
you-go”, respectively, reflect these differences in the bandwidth availability (Between, 2008). Finally
and most importantly, most of the active mobile connections are used by customers who already
have a broadband service on the fixed line, e.g., when traveling (Between, 2008). In sum, in the
Italian context, mobile broadband internet connections do not seem to constitute and/or used as a
valid substitute for the unavailability of ADSL in a municipality. Indeed the Italian government has
recently planned to invest 900 million euros in (mainly fixed-line) infrastructures to close this digital
divide (Agenda Digitale Italiana, 2013).
Figure B.1: Length of Local Loops in Select Countries
The figure illustrates the distribution of the length of “local
loops” in various countries (source: OECD, 2001).
Figure B.2: Italy’s Broadband Infrastructure
The figure illustrates the main elements of the “Fiber To The Exchange”system characterizing the Italian ADSL
infrastructure. The system involves a copper-wire connection between the end user premises and the closest Central
Office, and a fiber optic connection between the Central Office and the closest Urban Group Stage. Source:
(AGCOM, 2011).
Figure B.3: Distribution of ADSL Coverage and Location of UGS in Tuscany
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The figure reports the distribution of access to ADSL Internet services across
municipalities as of 2005 and the location of UGSs for the region of Tuscany,
with ADSL access increasing from darker (limited access) to lighter colors (full
access).
Figure B.4: Topographic Map of Tuscany
The figure reports the topographic map of Tuscany. The comparison between
this map and the one reported in figure B.3 illustrates the relationship between
terrain characteristics and access to ADSL technology.
Figure B.5: Evolution of ADSL Coverage (2005-2010)
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The figure reports the distribution of ADSL coverage by year with the percentage of household with ADSL
access increasing from grey (limited access) to black (full access). Source: Between.
Figure B.6: Broadband Penetration and Broadband Access, regional level (2006)
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The figure reports the scatterplot of regional broadband penetration against our mea-
sure of broadband access for 2006. Source (ISTAT 2013; Between)
